Iran's Teaching Moment

If Americans could realize that events in Iran are not about us, we all could learn alot about the nature of The Islamic Republic. Washington analysts for years have been stuck with a unilineal model for evaluating political developments abroad and fail to possess a dynamic model by which we can understand political change. For the average American the last week is a primer to the internal workings of the Iranian regime, showcasing elements of that society which the Washington crowd have minimized in importance and significance. I should just mention two--the armed forces and the religious establishment.

With the facade stripped away, we saw ayatollahs siding with the Green Revolution and the armed forces telling sectors of the Revolutionary Guard they refused to get involved suppressing the Iranian people. Many of us who follow Iran rather closely have often pointed to the dissent and pluralism within the Iranian religious community and their less than enthusiastic support for the proclaimed powers of the Supreme Leader. Most observers have always concluded that demographics spelled doom for the Islamic Republic but now we see how extensive are the fractures within the governing structures themselves.

According to the doctrines of the Islamic revolution, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is effectively an infallible political pope. Governing on the doctrine of the valyet-e faqih, the rule of the jurist, allegedly his word is final. But since the 1990s, many secular Iranian philosophers and religious figures in the city of Qom have openly challenged this doctrine--especially in light of Khamenei's own weak religious heritage. Many shi'ite clerics in Iran and throughout the region simply refuse to accept this doctrine because they claim that Islam would become tainted by the sins of the state and would cause younger generations to become more secularized. And, indeed, they were right. The current electoral crisis now revives the debate and deepens the divide between the government and the clergy. The numerous clerical institutions embedded in the government structure such as the Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council,are now divided.

Many of the clerics in Qom have sent emissaries to the protesters voicing support; others simply have failed to support Ahmadinejad. Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, the man originally selected to follow Khomeini before he criticized the excessive human rights violations of the regime,has ramped up his criticism of the process and declared the election results laughable. Grand Ayatollah Saanei has openly pronounced the Ahmadinejad presidency as illegitimate.

The position of the Supreme Leader is not that of the Pope in the media age with popemobiles and open air rallies for the Catholic faith; he's more secluded, only speaking forth of the anniversary of the Revolution and Ramadan. That's why Khamenei's appearance of Friday was so significant. For years he has always been considered an inferior religious scholar and is prohibited from issuing fatwas in his own country, being restricted to making religious rulings for Shi'ites abroad, where he faces fierce spiritual competitors such as Ayatollah Sistani of Iraq. Friday he had to emerge from behind the curtains to directly assert his political control, something he has been more reluctant to do than Khomeini.

Some observers called his "unity prayers" a gamble. I personally see it as a recognition of profound failure--even if he can suppress further demonstrations. From within Iran, there is circumstantial evidence that Khamenei told Mousavi he would win and that there was an agreement for modest reforms. He didn't want to have a reformer like Khatami ever again. The night of the election it has been reported that Khamenei actually told Mousevi he had won the election. And only hours later he announced Ahmadinejad's landslide victory--two hours after the polls closed in a country where paper ballots have to be counted. What truly transpired may remain a mystery for years but there are certain suggestions that the Revolutionary Guard "muscled" the Supreme Leader.

At the beginning of the protests, I like many people thought the cry of "Death to the Dictator" referred to Ahmadinejad but increasingly it is obvious and confirmed by Iranians that it referred to the Supreme leader.

How bad is it for Khamenei? Making his public prayer in nearly 20 years, the regime made sure to bus thousands of people in from the provinces. Decent television. But there were hundreds of rival prayers gatherings in dozens of mosques where prayers condemned him. For the "unity prayers", there were some extraordinary absences. Of the three "defeated" candidates, only Gen. Mohsen Rezai Mir-Qaed appeared. Over half the Islamic Majlis, Iran's parliament, were absent. Most of the members of the Assembly of Experts, a body of 92 mullahs who are suppose to supervise the work of the Supreme Leader, refused to go. Some senior members of the military and security establishment were also absent. If you were a Kremlinologist from the Cold War period, you would come to the conclusion that the organs of state are now severely divided.

There were some great moments for the outside world in Khamenei's speech--the mention of Waco, the denunciation of the British ( a bugaboo since the days of Mossadegh), and of course the Jews. He did try to placate Rafsanjani, the man who brokered the deal to make him Supreme Leader, and went out of his way to announce all the candidates were loyal members of the revolutionary family. Of course, they would not be able to run if they were not. Earlier he also reassured Rafsanjani who would not be prosecuted for corruption as Ahmadinjad had promised.

And what about Ahmadinjad? He received a boost by the Supreme Leader saying he agreed with him philosophically and in matters of foreign affairs. But he has been reduced to the simple role of puppet. His shrinking status has made him hide from view. Undoubtedly, once the protests are repressed, he will roar out again. But he has been reduced to a rather pathetic creature.

If the Supreme Leader crushes the opposition protests,there will be those within the government structures who believe the Republic side of the Islamic republic is dead. And conversely, the clerical elements will believe that the Islamic side is dead. The idea of a solely political Supreme Leader, especially one with overtly dictatorial powers, will ultimately be unacceptable to the religious establishment.

If peaceful change ever comes to Iran, it is very likely an ayatollah with real spiritual bona fides will be selected as an interim Supreme Leader to dismantle the entire position. Right now, Khamenei remains only the spirtual and political leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah, a strange position to be in.

The question I have is with whom can the United States negotiate with? Does Obama short-circuit everything and demand talks with the Supreme Leader and simply by-pass Ahmadinejad?